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How Ideology Became Policy:  The U.S. War in Iraq and the Role of 
Neo-conservatism 
 
Preface  
 I have spent much time reflecting on the decision to go to war in Iraq and the high cost 
paid by our service members for what I now believe to be a mistake.  In Iraq, U.S. losses include 
4,488 killed in action and 32,222 wounded in action.  In no way do these numbers reflect the 
deep loss felt by the family members of these brave young men and women.  Numbers will 
never be able to quantify the deep hole left in the lives of those who lost a loved one to this 
war.  Nor will numbers ever quantify the daily sacrifices made by families to care for their 
wounded warriors.  In economic terms, the war cost over two trillion dollars, but estimated 
long-term cost could be as high as six trillion.  One could also argue that the region is less stable 
now than it was prior to the Iraq war.  The truth is that the Iraq War has alienated U.S. friends 
and allies around the world and exposed the limits of U.S. military power for all to see and 
exploit.  In addition, it has encouraged Russian and Chinese strategic hostility, transformed Iraq 
into a recruiting and training ground for Islamist terrorism, and promoted the expansion of 
Iranian power in the region.  The world now faces the real possibility of a Shiite regime in 
Baghdad aligned with Tehran, which could undermine Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states 
with significant Shiite minorities, or even provoke a regional civil war along sectarian lines.   
 The cost of this war of choice genuinely hits home when I consider the price paid by my 
former mentor General James Cerrone and his wife Betty.  They lost their son 1LT Michael 
Cerrone in Iraq in 2006.  When I worked for then Major Cerrone, Mike and his brother James 
were just little kids, full of energy running around the back yard.  Mike chose to follow in his 
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father’s footsteps and became an officer (West Point Class of 2004) and was assigned as a 
platoon leader in Company A, 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and 82nd 
Airborne Division.  On November 12, 2006 Lieutenant Cerrone exited his Humvee to check out a 
suspicious car.  His gunner, Specialist Harry Winkler was covering the platoon from the 
turret.  As Mike neared the vehicle, a man exited the car and approached the Humvee.  The 
man detonated a bomb strapped to his body. Specialist Winkler and First Lieutenant Cerrone 
died in the blast.  Mike was doing what his father had trained me and countless other leaders to 
do – Mike was leading from the front.  Mike and Harry will forever be remembered for their 
brave and heroic sacrifice.  My criticism of the decision to go to war in Iraqis in no means 
intended to reflect negatively upon the brave sacrifices of our fine men and women in uniform.  
As a veteran I have great respect for those who serve our country and appreciate the sacrifices 
that they and their families shoulder for all of us.  For that very reason, I am furious when 
soldiers are unnecessarily placed in harm’s way, and I am outraged when leaders fail to perform 
due diligence before committing our service members to action.  Anger has motivated me to 
write about this topic, painful as this story is to tell.  It is sad and infuriating when I now read 
President Bush and Vice President Cheney’s pre-war speeches.  Claims from the famous 
Cincinnati speech in which President Bush asserts, “Iraq possesses and produces chemical and 
biological weapons” and is “seeking nuclear weapons (We Will Prevail 192).”  Even more chilling 
are the claims of operational links between Iraq and al Qaeda.  Vice President Cheney in his 
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) speech was absolutely certain: “Simply stated, there is no 
doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.  There is no doubt that he is 
amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us” (1).  There are 
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several rogue states with weapons of mass destruction (from here referred to as “WMDs”), but 
what made Iraq an immediate threat was the claims of operational ties to al Qaeda.  President 
Bush and other war proponents repeatedly spoke of al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein and 9/11 in the 
same breath.  Bush declared in September 2002, “You can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and 
Saddam Hussein when you talk about the war on terror” (Remarks by President Bush and 
President Uribe of Columbia, September 2002).  Those in charge could not have galvanized 
public support for an invasion of Iraq absent   a deliberate conflation of Saddam Hussein and al 
Qaeda into a single terrifying threat.  The President and Vice President presented a compelling 
yet false case for war, and the U.S. people and their elected representatives believed it.  The 
Congress voted overwhelmingly to support the action in Iraq (374 to 156, or 71% approval).  
The resolution supporting the Iraq war (October 16, 2002) gained more support than the 
resolution for the first Gulf War (January 12, 1991).  The claims of Iraq’s reconstituted WMD 
program appeared creditable in light of Saddam Hussein’s past history and conduct.  The 
administration was also making the rounds on the Sunday morning talk shows claiming to have 
conclusive evidence supporting operational links between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime.  The 
case seemed plausible and in the words of then CIA Director Tennant, “A slam dunk.”  Most 
people of adult age at the time remembers Secretary Powell’s presentation to the United 
Nations.  It had enormous impact and influence in this country and worldwide.  It convinced 
many people in the U.S. that we were on the right course.  Notably, in his autobiography, It 
Worked for Me in Life and Leadership, Colin Powell cites members of congress telling him that 
his presentation persuaded them to vote for the resolution (223).   
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In My American Journey, Colin Powell maintained,  
          Many of my generation, the captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels 
          seasoned in the Vietnam War vowed when it was our turn to call the shots,  
          we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons 
           that the American people could not understand or support. If we could make 
           good on that promise to ourselves, to the civilian leadership, and to the  
           country, then the sacrifices of Vietnam would not have been in vain (149). 
 
This is part of the iron that has driven my research.  As a young Army officer, I was trained to 
evaluate the strength of an intelligence briefing based on three questions formulated by then 
General Powell.  The three questions to be asked of the briefer are: (1) What do you know for 
certain (This is information that has been verified with multiple sources)?  (2) What do you wish 
you knew (The question is intended to identify key missing pieces of information that the 
intelligence community is unable to verify)? and (3) What do you think (based on experience 
and information the briefer provides their best assessment of the situation)?  It is important to 
keep in mind that intelligence typically involves a certain amount of judgment.  One never 
knows all the facts prior to rendering a decision and it is critical for decision makers to know 
how much of the intelligence assessment is based on fact vs. the briefer’s best estimate.  
Secretary Powell’s presentation put me firmly in the camp of supporters of the resolution to 
authorize military action in Iraq.  If Secretary Powell was convinced then I was convinced.  I 
assumed that Colin Powell was adhering to the rules he had helped to promote and create.  Not 
only did I trust Secretary Powell’s evaluation of the intelligence, I trusted that he fully knew 
what this decision would mean to the soldiers on the ground.  I felt Colin Powell was committed 
to protecting our troops and not repeating the mistakes of the past.   
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The neoconservatives had no such reluctance when it came to the use of military power.  
They had a “ready explanation” for the 9/11 attacks, provided intellectual justification for the 
war, and persuaded a new President George W. Bush, untutored in foreign policy, that a global 
assault on al Qaeda had to include regime change in Iraq. It was time for U.S. to use its military 
power to change the world for the better.  This reflected the core neoconservative belief in U.S. 
exceptionalism: The idea that the United States is the indispensable power in the international 
order and has a moral responsibility to promote democracy in other countries with force if 
necessary.  Hence, the removal of Saddam Hussein represented an opportunity to remake the 
Middle East.  They postulated a free and democratic Iraq would lead to an outbreak of 
democracy in the region.   
To neoconservatives, the flourishing of democracy in the region would cement 
America’s image as a benevolent hegemony around the world. But there are serious structural 
flaws underlying the concept of “America’s benevolent hegemony.”  First, benevolent 
hegemony rests on a belief in U.S. exceptionalism that most non-Americans simply find non-
credible.  Few people in the rest of the world believe the United States acts disinterestedly in 
international politics.  U.S. has interest as well as values, and, when it has to choose between 
the two, it will usually choose the former.  Thus, while attempting to establish democracy in 
Iraq, it then allies itself with dictatorships in Egypt and Pakistan and with a theocracy in Saudi 
Arabia, because the governments in Cairo, Islamabad, and Riyadh are more important to the 
United States as partners in the war on terrorism than they would be as democracies. 
This paper is limited in scope to the influence of neoconservative ideology on the 
George W. Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq.  There are many other contributing 
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factors and possible theories on why the U.S. invaded Iraq. Many have observed a link between 
those who would profit from a war in Iraq and those in power with ties to private companies, 
such as Vice President Cheney.  Others point to the vote in congress and how it could have 
been influenced by lobbyists for the vast military industrial complex. There are too many 
possible angles to cover them all, but the rhetorical glue that holds all these arguments 
together – the blind faith that provided the ideology -- is the influence of neoconservative 
thinking upon key elected leaders. Neoconservatives were pervasive in the George W. Bush 
Administration.  Of the twenty-five founding members of the Project for a New American 
Century1, ten entered the new administration.  Key among them was Dick Cheney, Donald 
Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.  These individuals had access at the highest level, and they used 
that access, along with a damaged post 9/11 U.S. psyche, to transition neoconservative 
ideology into official U.S. policy.  The Post 9/11 U.S. psyche was one of a country in a “defensive 
crouch” and focused on protection.  Neoconservatives leveraged the fear generated by the 
9/11 attacks to advocate the assertive promotion of democracy through military force.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) was an American think tank based in Washington, D.C. and 
founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan.  The PNAC’s stated goal is “to promote American global leadership.” 
Fundamental to the PNAC is the promotion of American exceptionalism. 
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Introduction  
In the weeks that followed the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush transitioned from an 
American president pursuing a domestic agenda to a national leader rallying a nation seeking 
vengeance and justice against those who committed the terrorist acts.  In the State of the 
Union address following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush argued, “Our war against terror is 
only beginning” (2002 State of the Union).  He singled out three nations – Iran, Iraq, and North 
Korea as constituting an “axis of evil.”  This proposition evoked clear moral issues, which 
contrasted the forces of good versus the forces of evil and it became President Bush’s rallying 
cry to the U.S. electorate.  Indeed in the months that followed, President Bush frequently 
returned to the “axis of evil” theme.  He used this argument in an attempt to persuade the U.S. 
public that the time had come to defend the country against terrorist attacks.  This included 
taking preemptive military action against those countries identified as possessing weapons of 
mass destruction and willing to collaborate with terrorist groups trying to harm the United 
States. 
The Bush Administration based its decision to invade Iraq upon four assumptions. The 
first assumption was that Saddam Hussein’s regime was on the verge of acquiring nuclear 
weapons and had already amassed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.  The second 
assumption was that the regime had meaningful links with Al Qaeda and had something to do 
with 9/11. The third assumption was that, within Iraq, the regime’s fall would be followed by 
rapid and peaceful democratization.  The fourth assumption was that a similar democratic 
transformation would be precipitated elsewhere in the region.  This democratization would 
lead to a new eagerness among Arab governments to make peace between Israel and a 
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presumptive Palestinian state.  If these four assumptions held true, the future of the Middle 
East would forever be altered by replacing dictatorships with democracy.  The Bush 
Administration maintained that the first two assumptions (WMD and links to Al Qaeda) were 
solidly supported by intelligence.  This paper will explore how neoconservative ideology 
informed the Bush Administration’s interpretation/use of intelligence, leading to the decision to 
invade Iraq (Gordon, Prewar Slide Show Cast Iraq in Rosy Hues).   
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Neoconservative Influence 
  When defining the neoconservative movement one has to understand the coalition is 
broad, containing sub-coalitions that disagree on some of the details of their policy 
preferences.  Nevertheless, I believe it is possible to identify a clear thread that connects the 
various sub-coalitions of contemporary foreign policy neoconservatives, namely that the moral 
purpose of U.S. power is to change the world for the better (Lynch 188).   The philosopher Leo 
Strauss, an early neoconservative thought leader, advocated the notion that free nations have a 
moral duty to oppose a tyrant.  This core belief evolved into U.S. exceptionalism – the idea that 
the United States is the indispensable power in the international order and has a moral 
responsibility to promote democracy in other countries, with force if necessary.  Hence, 
neoconservatives look to remake substantial parts of the world in the United States image 
(Halper and Clark 2004).  With respect to the Gulf War and, in particular Saddam Hussein, while 
he may have been defeated, he was not deposed, which allowed him to continue threatening 
U.S. economic and political interests in the region.  Post-Gulf War Iraq reconfirmed for 
neoconservatives that military victory was not enough and that the United States needed to 
pursue regime change (Kurth 593). 
 Ten years after the invasion of Iraq, many still wonder why President Bush ordered the 
invasion in the first place.  It is especially curious given the absence, during the run-up to the 
invasion (and since), of any evidence of either Iraqi complicity in the al Qaeda attacks of 9/11 
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, or an operational relationship between al Qaeda 
and the Baathist regime in Baghdad.  To be sure, momentum for a war with Iraq had existed 
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before 9/11 and even before President Bush took office, as “hawks” were scattered throughout 
the halls of Congress and the national security bureaucracy during the 1990s.  But a war against 
Iraqi in response to 9/11 was strategically nonsensical. 
 Douglas Feith, who served as undersecretary of defense for policy during George W. 
Bush’s first term, claims that in the wake of 9/11 attacks, “we could not define the enemy with 
precision with any short, clear formulations.”  Iraq, however, “was on the minds of many 
Administration officials” who shared “a common assumption … that a global war on terrorism 
would, at some point, involve a showdown with Iraq” (How Bush Sold the War, 2008). He also 
recounts his agreement with Donald Rumsfeld’s judgment, expressed three days after the 9/11 
attacks, that the U.S. response to the attacks should be a “sustained, broad campaign” against 
targets well beyond al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.  Rumsfeld’s injunction, 
“Don’t over-elevate the importance of al Qaida” (Feith, War and Decision 49), indicated that the 
war on terrorism was going to be a general one against all purveyors of terrorism, and not just 
against those who aided, abetted, and perpetrated the 9/11 attacks.   
 Afghanistan’s link to 9/11 was self-evident.  The attacks were planned in Afghanistan by 
a resident terrorist organization that enjoyed a geographic and ideological sanctuary in 
Afghanistan, courtesy of the Taliban regime in Kabul.  Afghanistan was al Qaeda’s central 
hideout, and the Taliban was comprised of al Qaeda’s ideological soul mates.  In the wake of 
9/11, no president could have refused military action against Afghanistan.  In contrast, the Bush 
administration simply asserted Iraq’s connection to 9/11 for the purpose of mobilizing public 
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and congressional support for a war that otherwise would have been a hard and perhaps 
impossible sell. 
 Policymakers and commentators who had been gunning for Saddam Hussein even 
before the Gulf War of 1991 successfully converted public rage over the al Qaeda attacks into a 
war to bring down the Iraqi dictator (Davis 35).   They transformed the reality of Osama bin 
Laden as an avowed enemy of “apostate” secular regimes in the Middle East into the fantasy of 
Osama bin Laden as an operational ally of Saddam Hussein.  President Bush and other war 
proponents repeatedly spoke of al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein, and 9/11 in the same breath.  As  
President Bush declared in September 2002, “You can’t distinguish between al Qaeda and 
Saddam when you talk about the war on terror … I can’t distinguish between the two, because 
they’re both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive” (Remarks by 
President Bush and President Uribe of Columbia, September 2002).   Thus, Saddam Hussein was 
suddenly depicted as a crazed, undeterrable dictator just months away from acquiring nuclear 
weapons and gleefully handing them over to bin Laden.  Public and congressional support for 
an invasion of Iraq simply could not be mustered absent a deliberate conflation of Saddam 
Hussein and al Qaeda into a single terrifying threat.  Richard A. Clarke, the former 
counterterrorism czar for both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, believes that,     
        “Any leader whom one can imagine as President on September 11 would  
        have declared a ‘war on terrorism’ and would have ended the Afghan 
        sanctuary by invading.  Almost any President would have stepped up 
        domestic security and preparedness measures.  Exactly what did George 
        Bush do after September 11 that any other President one can imagine 
13 
 
        wouldn’t have done after such attacks?  In the end, what was unique 
        about George Bush’s reaction to terrorism was his selection as an object 
        lesson for potential state sponsors of terrorism, not a country that had 
        been engaging in anti-U.S. terrorism but one that had not been, Iraq (Clark 244).” 
 
 Why did Bush select Iraq?  Largely because of key neoconservatives and their allies.  
Indeed, it is impossible to explain the road from 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq without recognizing 
the tremendous influence of the neoconservative opinion, both inside and outside the 
administration, on the Bush White House.  Accurately and colorfully described by Alan 
Weisman as,  
        “that rowdy collection of former liberal Democrats, Wilsonian globalist, and 
        Trotskyites who soured on the New Left for its wimpy, weak-kneed response 
        to the adventurism of the Soviet Union, and for its aversion to the use of 
        military force regardless of consequences (3).”   
 
The neoconservatives had a ready explanation for the 9/11 attacks, provided intellectual 
justification for the war, and persuaded a new President George W. Bush,  untutored in foreign 
policy, that a global assault on al Qaeda had to include regime change in Iraq.  Moreover, the 
neoconservatives reinforced the president’s predisposition to see the world in terms of good 
versus evil and to view the use of military power as the decisive determinant of relations 
among states.   
There was never a neoconservative faction or conspiracy to subvert Bush’s foreign 
policy.  Bush did not even have a well-formulated foreign policy before 9/11, and there was 
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nothing secret about the neoconservatives or their views.  The leading neoconservatives were 
public intellectuals who openly associated with each other and published extensively on foreign 
policy.  They shared a combative ideology about the nature of the world and America’s role in 
it, an ideology to which President George W. Bush, Vice President Cheney, and Scretary 
Rumsfeld were instinctively disposed, especially after 9/11.  These neoconservatives were not 
bashful about pushing their view on non-neoconservative policymakers; exhortation was their 
stock-in-trade.  In effect, the neoconservatives constituted an ideological interest group that 
sought to influence the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy, and influence it they 
did.  
In America Alone: The Neo-Conservative and the Global Order, a 2004 definitive 
assessment of neoconservative ideology and its influence on post 9/11 U.S. foreign policy, 
Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke persuasively assert: 
 The situation of unending war in which we find ourselves results in large 
 part from the fact that the policies adopted after 9/11, the initial strike  
 against the Taliban aside, were hardly specific to that event. Unlike the  
 policy of containment that evolved in direct response to Soviet moves in  
 Central and Eastern Europe and involved radical new thinking on the part 
 of those involved, the post 9/11 policy was in fact grounded in an ideology  
 that existed well before the terror attacks and that in a stroke of opportunistic 
 daring by its progenitors, has emerged as the new orthodoxy.  The paper trail 
 is unambiguous.  Minds were already made up. A preexisting ideological  
 agenda was taken off the shelf, dusted off, and relabeled as the response 
 to terror…. In neo-conservative eyes, the Iraq war was not about terrorism; 
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 it was about the pivotal relationship between Saddam Hussein and the assertion  
 of U.S. power.  Hussein provided, in effect, the opportunity to clarify 
 America’s global objectives and moral obligations.  His continued survival in  
 power was a metaphor for all that had gone wrong with U.S. foreign  
 policy since the Soviet collapse in the sense that the first Bush administration’s 
 Realpolitik and Clinton’s wishful liberalism had left the Iraqi dictator in power. 
 Iraq was now the arena in which to demonstrate the crucial tenets of neo- 
 conservative doctrine: military preemption, regime change, the merits of  
 exporting democracy, and a vision of U.S. power that is “fully engaged 
 and never apologetic (American Alone, 206).” 
 
The influence of neoconservative thinking on the Bush Administration’s response to the 
9/11 attacks is undeniable and becomes increasingly visible in formal policy documents.  
 President Bush’s post 9/11 receptivity to the neoconservative agenda was manifest in 
the administration’s provocative new security strategy.  In September 2002 the administration 
revealed the new strategy in the nations formal policy document on security, The National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), which embraced regime change in 
rogue states, aggressively promoted democracy, viewed U.S. military supremacy as a given, 
and, in a stunning departure from traditional U.S. foreign policy norms, asserted the right to 
launch preventive wars to protect national interests.  Before turning to that pivotal document, 
however, an understanding of neoconservative foreign policy ideology is in order.   
 Six core propositions define the essence of the neoconservative persuasion.  The first is 
that “evil is real,” and the second is that “for evil to prevail requires only one thing; for those 
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confronted by it to flinch from duty (Bacevich 73).”  The foundation of these propositions was 
the Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s, and the event to which neoconservatives 
constantly refer as the starting point for foreign policy instruction.   The third proposition is that 
“U.S. ideals define America’s purpose, to be achieved through the exercise of superior U.S. 
power (Bacevich 73).”  For neoconservatives, U.S. values and strategic interests are inseparable.  
Spreading democracy abroad is the paramount strategic interest, and the United States should 
not hesitate to use its global military primacy to clear obstacles to democracy.  The fourth 
proposition is an “appreciation for authority” stemming from the neoconservatives hatred of 
the New Left’s counterculture and political radicalism of the 1960s.  They despised liberal 
Democrats who turned against the Vietnam War and succumbed to political correctness at 
home.  The fifth is that “the United States after Vietnam confronted a dire crisis” with 
unspeakable consequences – i.e., that America had not only lost the will to win the Cold War 
but also, under the guidance of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and later Jimmy Carter, had 
actually sought to appease the Soviet Union via the mechanism of détente.  And the sixth is 
that “the antidote to crisis is leadership,” as exemplified by Ronald Reagan’s determination to 
win the Cold War once and for all (Bacevich 73). 
 Central to neoconservative ideology is the perpetuation of America’s post-Cold War, 
global military supremacy via – if necessary – unilateral preventive military action against rising 
rogue states seeking to acquire nuclear weapons.  Neoconservative intellectuals, many of them 
Jewish, sympathetic to the Likud Party’s imperial security ambitions for Israel, and haunted by 
the consequences of appeasing Hitler in the 1930s, have provided the core of the 
neoconservative construct of the world and America’s role in it.  The neoconservative agenda 
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also commands support, in varying degrees, among the broader conservative community.  In 
fact, the first George W. Bush administration was populated by prominent neoconservatives 
and other proponents of perpetual U.S. military primacy, the deputy secretary of defense, and 
the head of the Defense Policy Board.  Together with such influential neoconservative 
commentators as Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, and Lawrence Kaplan, 
these individuals provided both the intellectual and policy foundation of President Bush’s post-
9/11 foreign policy2.   
 Central to neoconservative political thought is that the security of the United States is 
ultimately assured only in a world of democracies – that is, a world rid of totalitarianism, 
autocracy, and terrorism (A democratic world would be a peaceful world because, as 
neoconservatives believe, as did Woodrow Wilson) democracies do not fight each other.  But a 
democratic peace is not inevitable.  Achieving it requires an activist U.S. foreign policy based on 
military primacy and a willingness to use force to ensure the ultimate triumph of U.S. political 
values.  Neoconservatives also believe people around the world aspire to these values, but do 
not prevail everywhere because of persistent tyranny.  They believe this to be especially true in 
the Middle East. 
 For neoconservatives, as well as for President George W. Bush after 9/11, tyranny and 
terrorism are moral evils that the United States is obligated to destroy.  “Wherever we carry it, 
the U.S. flag will stand not only for our power, but for freedom,” the president declared in his 
June 2002 speech to West Point’s graduating class.  He continued, “Our nation’s cause has 
                                                          
2 At first the offensive takes place in the pages of US newspapers and magazines. William Kristol and Robert Kagan 
write articles for the magazines Foreign Policy and the Weekly Standard; columnists Charles Krauthammer is 
syndicated in over 400 newspapers and is a regular contributor on FOX News. 
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always been larger than our nation’s defense.  We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a 
peace that favors human liberty.  We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and 
tyrants …. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every 
continent.  Building this peace is America’s opportunity and America’s duty.” 
 A seminal neoconservative document was the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, written 
for then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney by then Pentagon analysts Paul Wolfowitz who later 
served the George W. Bush administration as deputy secretary of defense and L. Lewis 
“Scooter” Libby who later became Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff.  The guidance called 
for establishing America’s military primacy over Eurasia by preventing the rise of any hostile 
power capable of challenging that primacy.  It also endorsed a policy of preventive 
disarmament of any rogue state seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction.  The 
document was never translated into policy because George H. Bush was defeated for reelection 
in 1992, but leaked excerpts of the document provoked sharp condemnation on Capitol Hill.
 Neoconservatives also condemned restrictive use-of-force doctrines favored by realists 
such as Casper Weinberger and Colin Powell.  The Weinberger – Powell doctrine defined “the 
national interest” as consisting of a grid of key ground, sea lanes, industrial centers, strategic 
choke-points and the like.  Kagan and Kristol argued, “This narrow, materialistic definition of 
interest was foisted upon our foreign policy establishment by realists in the middle of the 
century and it should be supplanted by a foreign policy based on honor and greatness in the 
service of liberal principles (National Interest and Global Responsibility, 23-24).”  In his essay 
Statesmanship in the New Century, Wolfowitz contends, “the core of U.S. foreign policy is … the 
universalization of U.S. principles.”  He wrote, “Nothing could be less realistic than the version 
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of realism that dismisses human rights as an important tool of foreign policy.”  In his view, citing 
the triumph of democracy in the Philippines, “democratic change is not only a way to weaken 
one’s enemies, it is also a way to strengthen our friends (319-320).”  Indeed, for 
neoconservatives, a democratic Middle East was the ultimate goal of regime change in Iraq.  
Neoconservatives not only subscribed to the “democratic peace” theory. They also believed the 
United States could establish democracy in Iraq and that Iraq’s example would provoke the fall 
of other tyrannical dominoes in the region.   George W. Bush, characteristically, had no doubts.    
        “Iraqi democracy will succeed,” he declared in a November 2003 speech to 
        the National Endowment of Democracy,  and that “success will send forth  
       the news, from Damascus to Tehran – that freedom can be the future of every 
       nation.  The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be 
        a watershed event in the global democratic revolution (Heilburn 265).”  
 
 The election of George W. Bush in 2000 ushered the neoconservatives into power, and 
by the time Bush ordered the invasion of Iraq in 2003 he had become a de facto 
neoconservative.  Of the twenty-five founding members of the Project for a New American 
Century (PNAC), ten entered the new administration:  Dick Cheney (VP), L. “Scooter” Libby 
(Cheney’s chief-of-staff), Donald Rumsfeld (secretary of defense), Paul Wolfowitz (deputy 
secretary of defense), Richard Perle (defense policy board chair), Paula Dobriansky 
(undersecretary of state for democracy and global affairs), Peter Rodman (assistant secretary of 
defense for international security affairs), Zalmay Khalilzad (special envoy to the Middle East 
and later ambassador to Iraq), Elliott Abrams (National Security Council staff member 
responsible for Middle East policy), and Eliot Cohen (DPB member).  Other neoconservatives 
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who were not PNAC founders also assumed key positions. Prominent among them were 
Douglas Feith (undersecretary of defense policy) and John Bolton (undersecretary of state for 
arms control and international security and later, ambassador to the United Nations)” (Barry 1-
3).  The neoconservatives’ influence was evident in President Bush’s wholesale embrace of their 
foreign policy ideology and language in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.  The adoption of 
neoconservative ideology was manifest in numerous presidential speeches, but most 
significantly in the pivotal foreign policy document of his presidency – the 2002 publication of 
the The National Security Strategy.   
 Neoconservatives like to suggest that Bush arrived at a neoconservative foreign policy 
on his own.  But to believe that assertion is to ignore the reality that Bush entered office as a 
foreign policy novice.  The 9/11 attacks created an opportunity for neoconservatives to provide 
a ready-made explanation and course of action.  It also ignores Bush’s arrival at the White 
House as a self-avowed realist who was critical of Clinton’s interventions in Haiti and the 
Balkans because they were not firmly anchored in threats vital to U.S. security interests.  In a 
November 1999 speech to the Federation of American Scientists, Bush declared that “a 
President must be a clear-eyed realist,” a statement that reflected the foreign policy approach 
of his father’s administration and of former secretary of defense Dick Cheney.  Until 9/11 the 
Bush White House did not take the al Qaeda threat seriously; on the contrary, the president 
displayed a general disinterest in foreign policy.  President Bush showed a much greater 
interest in such domestic issues as tax cuts, educational reform, deregulation, government 
support of faith-based charities, expanded oil drilling in Alaska, and federally restricted funding 
for stem cell research.  Further, he did not support significant increases in defense spending. 
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During the 2000 election campaign Al Gore had called for a larger five-year defense spending 
plan than Bush had proposed.  Moreover, he registered no note-worthy departure from his 
predecessor’s policies toward Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; indeed, Kaplan and Kristol 
complained that Bush “proceeded to water down even the demands that the Clinton team had 
imposed on Iraq (War Over Iraq, 71).” 
 Then came 9/11, which immediately transformed Bush into a foreign policy president 
and prepared the way for him to endorse the neoconservative’s vision of the world and 
America’s role in it.  “Bush the realist became a zealous Wilsonian,” observes Robert Litwak 
(25).”  As Kaplan and Kristol recounted, “Bush transformed himself from a realist following in 
his father’s footsteps to an internationalist touting America’s ideals as sincerely and forcefully 
as Harry Truman, John Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan before him (War Over Iraq, 72).”  The blunt 
assessment of the prestigious London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies is: 
 the events of September 11, 2001 provided hawks, including those of 
 “utopian” persuasion, with opportunity to push Iraq to the top of the  
 agenda.  They successfully exploited the belief in the upper tier of the 
 government immediately after the attacks that there was a better than 
 even chance that Iraq had been involved, and the more broadly held  
concern that Baghdad might in the future supply WMD to terrorists. 
In bureaucratic terms, this resulted in the insertion of a single provision, 
at the end of a presidential guidance document otherwise dedicated to  
the government’s response to 11 September, instructing the military to 
prepare for war with Iraq (Strategic Survey 2002-2003, 177).” 
 
22 
 
Neoconservative White House speechwriter (and coiner of the “axis of evil” phrase) 
David Frum, in his 2003 memoir of the impact of 9/11 on President Bush, traced the 
transformation of Bush’s thinking from realism to idealism with respect to the war on terrorism.  
This change was reflected in Bush’s broadening conception of the source of the terrorist 
challenge to include the absence of democracy in the Middle East.  Traditional U.S. policy had 
favored stability over justice, but the “pursuit of stability in the Middle East had brought chaos 
and slaughter to New York and Washington.  Bush decided that the United States was no longer 
a status quo power in the Middle East (231).”  Iraq quickly began moving to the center stage in 
the Bush White House, with Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz pushing the Iraq agenda.  Within hours 
after the attacks, Iraq popped up in the White House Situation Room discussions.  The apparent 
assumptions, unsupported by any hard evidence, were that no terrorist organization could 
possibly have carried out such an action on its own – i.e. without rogue state support – and that 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was the probable state sponsor.  Expecting to attend meetings focused 
on al Qaeda, “I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq,” recalls Richard Clarke, the Bush 
White House’s counterterrorism director: 
At first I was incredulous we were talking about something other than 
getting al Qaeda.  Then I realized with almost a sharp physical pain that 
Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try to take advantage of this national 
tragedy to  promote their agenda about Iraq.  Since the beginning of the  
administration, and well before, they had been pressing for war against 
Iraq (Against All Enemies, 30). 
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When Clark said that the focus should be on Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, Wolfowitz 
countered that the main threat was Iraqi terrorism.  “I said, that’s interesting, because there 
hasn’t been any Iraqi terrorism against the United States for over eight years (Against All 
Enemies 30).”  Further Clarke asserts, “For Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz, Iraq was the most 
dangerous thing in national security … a rigid belief and a decision already made.  No fact or 
event could derail (Against All Enemies, 265).”  Thus, from the start, neoconservatives inside 
the administration’s upper reaches were prepared to lump together Iraq and al Qaeda into an 
undifferentiated terrorism threat and to use the al Qaeda attacks as the fulcrum for a war on 
Iraq that would finish off Saddam Hussein once and for all.   
 Secretary of State Colin Powell opposed the Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz option and persuaded 
the president to focus on al Qaeda first.  “Any action needs public support,” he argued.  “It’s 
not just what the international coalition supports: it’s what the U.S. people want to support.  
The U.S. people want us to do something about al Qaeda (Woodward, Bush at War, 49).”   
Clarke added, for good measure:  “Having been attacked by al Qaeda, for us to now go bombing 
Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl 
Harbor (Against All Enemies, 31).”   According to Powell biographer Karen DeYoung, the 
proposed Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz option made it “clear to Powell that some of his colleagues were 
trying to use the events of September to promote their own policy obsessions and settle old 
scores (The Life of Colin Powell, 379).” 
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and a receptive president combined to permit the 
translation of the neoconservatives’ ideology into established U.S. foreign policy, the major 
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tenets of which were laid out in the White House’s 2002 National Security Strategy.  The 
document is a symphony of neoconservative themes, objectives, and language: (a) The 
universality of core U.S. political values, (b) the presence of evil regimes, (c) the need to 
perpetuate America’s global military primacy, (d) the confidence in force as an instrument of 
overseas regime change, (e) the imperative of democratic expansion, and (f) the embrace of 
preventive war are all there.  What quickly became known as the “Bush Doctrine” consisted of 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) and key antecedent presidential pronouncements, 
including Bush’s speeches before the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism on 
November 6, 2001; his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002; his remarks before the 
student body of the Virginia Military Institute on April 17, 2002; and his speech to the 
graduating class at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on June 1, 2002.  By the fall of 2002 
the administration had in place a clear, declaratory use-of-force policy whose objectives was 
stated in the title of the NSS’s chapter 5: “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, 
and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction." 
 The NSS opens by declaring the universality of U.S. values, a key tenet of 
neoconservative ideology: 
 The great struggles of the twentieth between liberty and totalitarianism 
 ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom – and a single 
 sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free  
 enterprise … People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose 
 who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children – 
 male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. 
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 These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every  
 society  - and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies 
 is the common calling of freedom loving people across the globe and  
 across the ages (59). 
 
It then states the basis and goals of the U.S. national security strategy: The U.S. national 
security strategy will be based on a distinctly U.S. internationalism that reflects the union of our 
values and our national interest.  The aim of the strategy is to help make the world not just 
safer but better (60). 
 As for threats to the United States, the NSS holds that the “gravest danger our nation 
faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology (iv).”  Specifically, the acquisition of 
weapons of mass destruction by enemies of the United States.  “Our enemies have openly 
declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they 
are doing so with determination.  The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed (iv).”  
Of particular concern is the possible acquisition of WMD by terrorist organizations via the 
assistance of rogue states.  The NSS presumes the terrorist organizations are clients or allies of 
rogue states with Iraq and North Korea mentioned by name.  The presumption is that rogue 
states would be the most likely suppliers of WMD to terrorist organizations.  Therefore, the 
logical action is to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten 
or use WMD against the United States and our allies and friends.  The NSS states preventive 
force is imperative because fanatical terrorist organizations and reckless dictators are 
undeterrable.  It stipulates,  
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       Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the U.S. can no longer solely 
        rely on reactive posture as we have in the past.  The inability to deter a 
        potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude 
       of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons 
        do not permit that option.  We cannot let our enemies strike first … Traditional 
        concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed 
        tactics are wanton destruction and targeting of innocents, whose so-called 
        soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is 
        statelessness (14). 
 
 To sustain a capacity for effective preventive military action, the NSS contends that the 
United States “must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge (29),” reflecting another 
central tenet of neoconservative ideology.  This stipulation means that our forces will be strong 
enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States.  Additionally, the NSS provided the 
intellectual rationale and policy framework for preventive war against Iraq as well as any other 
rogue state that had, or might someday have, the temerity to challenge America’s post-Cold 
War global hegemony.  The state challenge was cast in terms of WMD acquisition, especially 
concerning nuclear weapons.  In its essence, the Bush Doctrine was about forcible and 
preventive counter-proliferation to preserve America’s military primacy and freedom of military 
action and to spread U.S. political values abroad.  As such, the doctrine was a dream come true 
for neoconservative and nationalist hawks.   
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The Case for War 
By the time President George W. Bush ordered U.S. forces to invade Iraq, he and other 
top officials in his administration had painted a terrifying picture of Saddam Hussein.  The 
dictator was depicted as a Hitler with weapons of mass destruction, a despot on the verge of 
acquiring the ultimate weapon of mass destruction and determined to use it against the United 
States.  It was a picture that justified preventive war.  The President and other war proponents 
played down the risk of a protracted war involving tens of thousands of U.S. casualties and 
trillions of dollars.  The war would be a “cakewalk,” a larger-scale repeat of the unexpectedly 
swift and seemingly decisive victory in Afghanistan.  Saddam Hussein’s regime was militarily 
much weaker than it had been in 1991, and the oppressed Iraqi people, upon liberation, would 
naturally work to establish institutions of democratic governance. 
The Iraqi threat was cast most starkly in two key speeches: Vice President Cheney’s 
speech to the 103rd National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) on August 26, 
2002, and President Bush’s speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center on October 7, 2002.  
Cheney, in his speech, called Iraq “a mortal threat” to the United States: “The Iraqi regime has 
… been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents.  And 
they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago.”  Cheney added, 
“Many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.”  
Once he acquired the full panoply of WMD, “Saddam Hussein could then be expected to seek 
domination of the entire Middle East, take control of a great portion of the world’s energy 
supplies, directly threaten U.S. friends throughout the region, and subject the United States or 
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any other nation to nuclear blackmail.”  Cheney was absolutely certain: “Simply stated, there is 
no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.  There is no doubt that 
he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”  
In Cincinnati, Bush said Iraq was “a grave threat to peace” because of its “history of 
aggression” and “drive toward an arsenal of terror.”  Iraq “possesses and produces chemical 
and biological weapons” and “is seeking nuclear weapons.”  Bush then went on to explain why 
Iraq is different from other countries or regimes that also have terrible weapons: 
While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands 
 alone because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place. 
Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous 
Tyrant who has already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of 
people. This same tyrant has tried to dominate the Middle East, has 
invaded and occupied a small neighbor, has struck other nations 
without warning, and holds an unrelenting hostility toward the United 
States.  By its past and present actions, by its technological capabilities, 
by the merciless nature of the regime, Iraq is unique. 
 
Bush went on to assert that Iraq possessed: (1) a biological weapons arsenal capable of 
killing millions; (2) ballistic missiles with ranges to strike Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and other 
nations; and (3) a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used to 
disperse chemical or biological weapons across broad areas.  Indeed, “we’re concerned that 
Iraq is exploring ways of using these unmanned aerial vehicles for missions targeting the United 
States.”  The threat, moreover, was critical: 
Some ask how urgent this danger is to America and the world. The 
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danger is already significant, and it only grows worse with time. If 
we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today – and we 
do – does it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him 
as he grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons? 
 
Bush then postulated an Iraqi alliance with Al Qaeda and Iraq’s possible transfer of 
WMDs to Al Qaeda: 
We know that Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network share a common 
enemy – the United States.  We know that Iraq and Al Qaeda have had 
 high-level contacts that go back more than a decade. …and we know 
 that after 9/11, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the 
 terrorist attack on America. Iraq could decide on any given day to 
 provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or  
individual terrorist.  Alliance with terrorist could allow the Iraqi  
regime to attack America without leaving any fingerprints … Saddam Hussein 
 is harboring terrorists and the instruments of terror, the instruments 
 of mass death and destruction.  And he cannot be trusted.  The  
 risk is simply too great that he will use them, or provide them  
 to a terrorist network. 
 
In addition, Bush did not see any meaningful difference between terrorist groups and 
rogue states: “Terror cells and outlaw regimes building weapons of mass destruction are 
different faces of the same evil.  Our security requires that we confront both.” 
Bush then turned to the Iraqi nuclear threat.  He claimed that the evidence, including 
Saddam Hussein’s “numerous meetings with Iraqi nuclear scientists, a group he calls his 
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‘nuclear mujahedeen,’” supported the conclusion that “Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear 
weapons program.”  The threat was near and horrific: 
If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of 
highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it  
could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. And if we allow 
that to happen, a terrible line would be crossed. Saddam Hussein would be 
in a position to blackmail anyone who opposes his aggression. He 
would be in a position to dominate the Middle East. He would 
be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would  
be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists. 
 
The president concluded his portrayal of the Iraqi threat by invoking the specter of a nuclear 
9/11: 
  Some Citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem 
  why do we need to confront it now?  And there’s a reason. 
  We’ve experienced the horrors of September the 11th.  We have 
  seen that those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes 
  into buildings full of innocent people.  Our enemies would be no 
  less willing, in fact they would be eager, to use biological or 
  chemical, or nuclear weapons.  Knowing these realities, America 
  must not ignore the threat gathering against us.  Facing clear  
  evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking 
gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud (President Bush,  
“Outlines Iraqi Threat.”  Cincinnati Museum Center. 7 October 2002). 
  
Noah Feldman has observed that the U.S. invasion of Iraq, “was the product of several 
disparate, mutually conflicting strands of thought, some benightedly idealistic, others brutally 
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realist, and almost all based on some misunderstanding of the likely consequences of the 
invasion of Iraq itself (19).”  A review of prewar administration statements and of the 
neoconservatives’ official and unofficial arguments reveals no coherent U.S. grand strategy for 
Iraq.  Such a strategy would have recognized the limits of U.S. military power as an instrument 
of foreign political change and paid at least some attention to how a successful post-war 
Baathist political order would be established in Iraq.  Rather, we find an assortment of declared 
and undeclared war aims with differing appeals to various policymakers who themselves were 
motivated by disparate and sometimes contradictory agendas.  The administration’s war aims 
included: preventing nuclear proliferation, completing the “unfinished business” of the 1991 
Gulf War, demonstrating a willingness to use U.S. military power, asserting the principle of 
preventive military action, intimidating Iran and North Korea, transforming the Middle East, 
vindicating the Pentagon’s revolutionary employment of force and last but not least, ridding the 
world of evil. 
 The very number and diversity of aims, and the mutual antagonism of some, reflect a 
lack of consensus on purpose of the war and a lack of confidence in the persuasiveness of any 
single aim.  Was the purpose of the war avenging 9/11, eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction, knocking off an ally of Osama bin Laden, punishing a dictator, freeing an oppressed 
people, flexing America’s high-tech military muscle, helping Israel, democratizing the Middle 
East, intimidating other rogue states, suppressing global terrorism, destroying evil, or all of the 
above?  Did the multiplicity of war aims betray the war proponents’ need to view the war as a 
necessity vs. a war of choice?  The failure to discover Iraq’s much hyped WMDs or an 
operational linkage between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al Qaeda certainly produced an 
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official shift of emphasis toward establishing freedom and democracy in the Middle East as the 
central justification for the war. 
 It remains unclear how seriously war proponents took the Iraqi threat that they so 
grossly inflated for political purposes.  Four months after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld acknowledged that the administration “did not act in Iraq because we 
discovered dramatic new evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass murder.  We acted 
because we saw the existing evidence in a new light, through the prism of our experience on 
September 11th (Rumsfeld, Testimony on Iraq. July 9, 2003).”  In other words, the 
administration acted on the basis of a theoretical threat.  It supposed the possibility of a future 
similar attack, armed this time with Iraqi supplied weapons of mass destruction, and acted to 
foreclose that theoretical possibility. 
 In his account of the Bush administration and the war on terror, Douglas Feith, a 
prominent neoconservative who served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2001 to 
2005, claims: 
         no one I know believed Saddam Hussein was part of 9/11 plot; we had 
         no substantial reason to believe he was.  Nor did we have any intelligence 
        Iraq was plotting specific operation with al Qaida or any other terrorist 
        group.  The administration’s rationale for war did not depend solely on concern 
         about weapons of mass destruction, much less on whether Saddam Hussein 
        had WMD stockpiles on hand.  The real threat was Saddam Hussein’s 
        retention of personnel and facilities to produce chemical and biological  
        weapons and the intention to reinvigorate his programs (Feith, 215).    
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The theory postulated that Saddam Hussein so armed could then transfer weapons of mass 
destruction to anti-U.S. terrorist organizations, or could launch a new assault on Kuwait since 
possession of weapons of mass destruction could put Saddam Hussein in a position to deter the 
United States from interfering.  This argument doesn’t explain how Saddam Hussein’s 
possession in 1991 of a truly robust arsenal of deliverable chemical and biological munitions 
failed to deter the United States from taking action to push him out of Kuwait.  In addition, this 
line of reasoning fails to explain why Saddam Hussein didn’t restart WMD production following 
the first gulf war. 
 Thus, the United States went to war against Saddam Hussein’s hostile intentions and the 
chance that he might resume production of chemical and biological weapons.  As Richard Betts 
observes, “The intelligence community had almost no hard evidence that Iraq was retaining the 
chemical and biological weapons it had at the time of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, or had 
manufactured new ones, or was reassembling its nuclear weapons program (118).”  The 
intelligence community “failed to uncover much new information after United Nations Special 
Commission on Iraq inspectors left Iraq in 1998. Much of the information it did get came from 
defector reports that turned out to be fabricated and unreliable (118).”    Iraq’s hostility was 
considered a given, as was its retention of chemical and biological weapons that had gone 
unaccounted for in 1998.  The intelligence community had been shocked by how much Saddam 
Hussein’s nuclear program had been successfully concealed before the Gulf War, and the Iraqi 
dictator, at least until November 2002 (when he agreed to permit the return of U.N. 
inspectors), was still acting as if he had something to hide. 
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 That the administration deliberately deceived the U.S. electorate by postulating both 
Iraqi WMD threat and an Iraqi al Qaeda alliance far beyond the available evidence is no longer a 
matter of dispute.  After 9/11, when it was clear that the CIA would not forcefully advocate 
regime change in Iraq, neoconservatives established the Office of Special Plans and the Policy 
Counterterrorism Evaluation Group, both situated in the Pentagon.  Both intelligence research 
units also bypassed the normal interagency vetting process.  It was the Office of Special Plans 
that helped get congressional leaders on board by directly briefing them with evidence that 
Baghdad had chemical and biological weapons and would soon have nuclear weapons.  
Briefings to leaders in Congress also included confirmation of a close relationship between 
Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (Betts, 118).  Evidence put forth in congressional testimonies, 
speeches, interviews, and articles and at meetings with Members of Congress included 
uncorroborated and questionable intelligence that was cherry-picked to convince audiences 
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (Halper and Clarke 2004). Neoconservatives and 
their allies also pressured intelligence agencies and analysts to validate their claims, such as the 
story that Saddam Hussein attempted to acquire yellowcake uranium from Niger and that 
Saddam Hussein was behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (Phythian 2008).  
Cheney became the neoconservatives’ most powerful ally in creating an environment where 
intelligence agencies and analysts felt pressured to validate administration claims about Iraqi 
stocks of WMD and links to al Qaeda (Phythian, 2008).  On multiple occasions between 
September 2001 and February 2003, Cheney and his chief of staff went to the CIA headquarters 
to discuss intelligence – which entailed repeatedly asking analysts to “restate their judgments 
(Phythian, 216).”   
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Information on the threats that Saddam Hussein posed WMD was coupled with 
assurances that removing him would be relatively straightforward, while Iraqi oil revenues 
would make reconstruction cheap.  Intelligence and assessments of war costs that contradicted 
the neoconservative line were ignored or buried (Kaufmann 21).  The ability of 
neoconservatives to disseminate their version of evidence was buttressed by an ability to 
secure allies in the media, especially talk radio and cable news.  These media allies were 
effective in mobilizing the attentive public to support neoconservative ideas as witnessed by 
favorable opinion polls; 70-90 percent of the public in late 2002 believed Saddam Hussein was 
planning a WMD attack on the United States (Kaufman, 43). 
In surveying the discrepancies between what Bush and other top administration officials 
were publicly claiming and what was actually known at the time, Joseph Pfiffner concluded:     
                From the publicly available evidence, the president misled the 
 Country in implying that there was a connection between Saddam 
 Hussein and 9/11. The administration’s claims about Iraq’s nuclear 
 capacity were based on dubious evidence that was presented in 
 a misleading manner. Claims about chemical and biological weapons 
 were based on legitimate evidence that was widely accepted 
 internationally … Claims of Saddam Hussein’s ability to deliver these  
                weapons, however, were exaggerated.  Finally, there was circumstantial 
 and inconclusive evidence that in 2002 the intelligence community 
 may have been under pressure to support the administration’s goals (25).”   
 
In the summer of 2002, Marine General Anthony Zinni, the president’s special envoy to 
the Mideast, signaled that the military was not in favor of a war in Iraq.  “I can give you many 
more priorities (Isikoff and Corn 28).”  Zinni further argued that a “war would be expensive, 
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stretch the military, and antagonize America’s allies.  It would interfere with efforts to defeat al 
Qaeda and end up requiring the United States to keep troops in Iraq forever.”  He added, “It’s 
pretty interesting that all the generals see it the same way, and all the others who have never 
fired a shot and are hot to go see it another way” (Isikoff and Corn, 28).  
 In an even more extensive survey of the evidence, Chaim Kaufmann contends the 
administration was guilty of deliberate “threat inflation.”  He defines threat inflation as: (1) 
claims that go beyond the range of ambiguity that disinterested experts would credit as 
plausible; (2) a consistent pattern of worst-case assertions over a range of factual issues that 
are logically unrelated; (3) use of double standards in evaluating intelligence in a way that 
favors worst-case threat assessments; or (4) claims based on circular logic, such as Bush 
administration claims that Hussein’s alleged hostile intentions were evidence of the existence 
of WMD whose supposed existence was used as evidence of his intentions.  Kaufman maintains 
that “administration exaggerations of the Iraqi threat during 2002-2003 qualify on all four 
grounds.  The errors did not result from mistakes by U.S. intelligence agencies.  Rather, top 
officials knew what policy they intended to pursue and selected intelligence assessments to 
promote that policy based on their political usefulness, not their credibility (29).”  Wolfowitz 
virtually admitted as much when he told a Vanity Fair interviewer in May 2003, “We settled on 
the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction, as the 
core reason (Tannenhaus).   
 A 2004 study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace also detected a 
politically driven shift in intelligence assessment in 2002.  It discovered a wide gap between 
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what was claimed and what was known, especially the alliance between Saddam Hussein and 
Osama bin Laden.  The endowment reported: 
  There was and is no solid evidence of a cooperative relationship 
  between Saddam Hussein’s government and al Qaeda.  There was no 
  evidence to support the claim that Iraq would have transferred 
  WMD to al Qaeda and much evidence to counter it.  The notion 
  that any government would give its principal security assets 
  to people it could not control in order to achieve its own political 
  aims is highly dubious (Cirincione, Matthews and Perkovich, 7). 
  
 In his exhaustive study of the administration’s threat statements and the actual 
document-by-document intelligence available to the administration, John Prados, an analyst 
with the National Security Archive and long-standing observer of the CIA, concluded that the 
administration “consistently distorted, manipulated, and ignored intelligence information, as 
the president, vice president, secretaries of defense and state, and others, sought to persuade 
the country that the facts about Iraq were other than what the intelligence indicated (Prados xi-
xii).”    It was a case study in government dishonesty in which deception was systematic and 
carried out purposefully to create the conditions the administration hoped would justify a war. 
 Writing in 2006, CIA analyst Paul Pillar, who served as the national intelligence officer 
for the Near East and South Asia from 2003 to 2005, declared that the Bush administration 
“used intelligence not to inform decision making, but to justify a decision already made.  It went 
to war without requesting any strategic level intelligence assessments on any aspect (18).”  The 
intelligence community, on its own initiative, conducted an assessment of the problems the 
United States was likely to face in a post-invasion Iraq.  The analysis presented a picture of a 
38 
 
political culture that would not provide a fertile ground for democracy and foretold a long, 
difficult, and turbulent transition.  It projected that a Marshall Plan-type effort would be 
required to restore the Iraqi economy, despite Iraq’s abundant oil resources.  It forecast a 
deeply divided Iraqi society, with Sunnis resentful over the loss of their dominant position and 
Shiites seeking power commensurate with their majority status, and there was a significant 
chance that the groups would engage in violent conflict unless an occupying power prevented 
it.  The assessment anticipated a foreign occupying force would itself be the target of 
resentment and attacks – unless it established security and put Iraq on the road to prosperity in 
the first few weeks or months after the fall of Saddam Hussein (Pillar, 21). 
 The intelligence community also assessed the likely regional consequences of over 
throwing Saddam Hussein and concluded the any value Iraq might have as a democratic 
exemplar would be minimal because of its being imposed by an outside power.   It also 
determined that war and occupation more likely would boost political Islam and increase 
sympathy for terrorists’ objectives, and Iraq would become a magnet for extremists from 
elsewhere in the Middle East (19).  Pillar then went on to discuss the discrepancies between the 
administration’s public statements and the intelligence community’s judgments, with the 
greatest being the relationship between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda.  The enormous 
attention devoted to this subject did not reflect any judgment by intelligence officials that there 
was or was likely to be anything like the alliance the administration said existed.  The reason 
the connection got so much attention was that the administration wanted to hitch the Iraq 
expedition to the war on terror and the threat the U.S. public feared most, thereby capitalizing 
on the country’s militant post 9/11 mood.   
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In a September 2006 interview with CBS News correspondent Katie Couric, President 
Bush himself confessed, “one of the hardest parts of my job is to connect Iraq to the war on 
terror (Johnson Transcript: President Bush).”  The Bush White House may well have believed 
that a war with Iraq was necessary to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons 
and possibly transferring them to al Qaeda.  The shock of 9/11 frightened many Americans into 
believing all sorts of terrifying possibilities, and the White House, after all, had the responsibility 
of protecting the country from future attacks.  A near universal assumption within the national 
security community was that additional terrorist attacks were forthcoming.  The White House 
was not alone in imagining the horror of 9/11 style attacks conducted with weapons of mass 
destruction.  The 2002 National Security Strategy was quite right to define the marriage of 
radicalism and technology as a potentially grave security threat.  And it was certainly 
reasonable, given Saddam Hussein’s long-standing enmity toward the United States as well as 
his track record of reckless miscalculation, to imagine the possibility of his collaboration with 
anti-American terrorist organizations. 
Yet it bears repeating that by March 2003, when Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was 
launched, there was no evidence of Iraqi complicity in al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks.  Additionally, 
though the White House had sought to conflate al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein as a unitary 
threat, no hard evidence exists of any operational collaboration between the terrorist 
organization and Baghdad’s Baathist regime.   Notwithstanding official talk of smoking guns and 
mushroom clouds, no one found evidence of a functioning Iraqi nuclear weapons program, 
much less an imminent Iraqi bomb.  Saddam Hussein’s purported nuclear program was thus 
simply wished into imminent capabilities.   
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Furthermore, there was no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein’s potential use of 
WMDs, had he possessed them, was exempt from the grim logic of nuclear deterrence.  True, 
he had employed chemical weapons against Iranian infantry and Kurdish villagers in the 1980s, 
but his victims were incapable of effective retaliation in kind.  More notable was his refusal 
during the Gulf War of 1991 to launch such weapons against Israel or Coalition forces, both of 
which were capable of devastating retaliation.  Saddam Hussein was prone to miscalculation.  
Witness his disastrous invasions of Iran and Kuwait and his repeated misjudgments of America’s 
willingness to use military force.  Saddam Hussein was prone to miscalculation, but never was 
he suicidal.  He loved himself more than he hated the United States.  Unlike Hitler in his bunker, 
Saddam Hussein chose capture rather than suicide.  As Steven Metz observed, “Hussein had a 
penchant for miscalculation, not for suicide.  He was willing to use chemical weapons against 
his own people, but had not used them against coalition forces in 1991 specifically because he 
knew to do so would risk his own grasp on power and survival.  Despite the claim of the 
administration, nothing, not even September 11, had changed Hussein’s desire for survival and 
retention of power (117).” 
The portrait of Saddam Hussein as undeterrable was of course a necessary ingredient in 
the case for preventive war.  A deterrable Hussein would have been just that – deterrable – and 
therefore unworthy of a war.  He would have been similar to other rogue dictators, none of 
whom had ever employed WMD against the United States, Israel, or a treaty ally of the United 
States.  Saddam Hussein ruled a state consisting of vast assets including: economic and 
governmental infrastructure, military forces, and population that were subject to devastating 
U.S. retaliation.  This largesse put Hussein in a strategically different category from bin Laden, 
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who led an elusive, transnational terrorist organization with little in the way of exposed assets. 
The Bush administration’s presumption of rogue state irrationality was in fact a recipe for 
repeated strategic miscalculation.  The presumption assumes a generic irrationality irrespective 
of specific regimes’ circumstances and regime leaders’ personalities, and it does so even with 
few historical examples of genuinely insane state leaders.  Political extremism and radicalism 
are not synonymous with irrationality.  Bin Laden demonstrated an impressive capacity to 
calculate ends and means relationships, and to plan and execute successful terrorist operations.   
The White House’s suggestion that Saddam Hussein might transfer nuclear munitions to 
al Qaeda was always far-fetched.  First, the Iraqi dictator could never be sure such a transfer 
could be made undetected.  Further, just as all Stalinist styled dictators, he was not in the habit 
of handing over power, to say nothing of the destructive power of nuclear weapons, to any 
organization outside his complete control.  Hussein was certainly aware that bin Laden 
regarded the Baathist regime in Baghdad as an apostate government.  As Steven Metz has 
observed, “No state has ever given terrorists more power that it, itself possesses.  There is no 
incentive for rogue regimes to hand over their hard won nuclear capabilities, prestige and 
power to Al Qaeda.  Regimes like Kim Jong Il’s North Korea, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran, or 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq tend to be paranoid and obsessed with finding and eliminating 
alternative sources of power to their rule.  The President and others repeatedly said that 
Saddam Hussein “could” hand over WMD to al Qaeda.  It is certainly technically possible, but 
they never provided more than vague innuendo to suggest what incentives Saddam Hussein 
might have gained from doing so.  This is because the proposition does not bear scrutiny (35).”  
The White House presumed an Iraqi willingness to transfer WMDs to al Qaeda on the basis of a 
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shared hatred for the United States.  This supposition ignored Hussein’s regional focus, 
especially on Iran, an enemy he always regarded as more dangerous than the United States.  It 
also ignored Hussein’s paramount interest in maintaining and increasing his own power.  Far 
from advancing his regional and personal agendas, an Iraqi WMD attack on the U.S. homeland 
would have guaranteed a regime destroying U.S. retaliatory response.  
There were always powerful barriers to cooperation between al Qaeda and the Baathist 
Iraq, and many experts, including Brent Scowcroft, George H. W. Bush’s national security 
adviser, repeatedly pointed out before the Iraq War.  “Saddam Hussein’s goals have little in 
common with the terrorist who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make 
common cause with them,” Scowcroft wrote in a Wall Street Journal op-ed urging Bush 
administration not to attack Iraq.  “He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass 
destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them 
for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address.”  Even “threatening to use 
these weapons for blackmail – much less their actual use – would open him and his entire 
regime to a devastating response by the U.S. (Don’t Attack Saddam).”  Al Qaeda regards 
nationalism as an apostate threat, a divider of Muslims from one another.  Osama bin Laden’s 
stated goal was the reestablishment of the caliphate (a politically indivisible Muslim 
community), and he viewed Saddam Hussein and all other secular Arab leaders as infidels.  
Hussein’s role models were Saladin and Stalin, not Mohammed.  Saddam Hussein spent eight 
years waging war against the existential threat to his regime posed by the Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
Iranian theocracy, Osama bin Laden could never have been a trustworthy ally.  In the context of 
the National Security Council’s examination of who was behind the 9/11 attacks, two experts 
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on Islamic terrorism observed, “bin Laden was deeply contemptuous of Saddam Hussein.  For 
believers like bin Laden, Saddam Hussein was the second coming of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a 
secular pharaonic ruler who destroyed the religion and oppressed the Umma (the community 
of Muslim believers). There is little evidence that Saddam Hussein viewed bin Laden and his ilk 
any differently than Nasser viewed Islamist activists (Benjamin and Simon, 254).” 
No post-invasion evidence emerged to support the existence of an al Qaeda-Saddam 
Hussein alliance.  The 9/11 Commission reported in 2005 that while there may have been 
contacts between al Qaeda and the Baathist regime, “we have seen no evidence that these … 
ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship.  Nor have we seen evidence 
indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in developing or carrying out attacks against the 
United States (Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, 66).”  A more definitive 2007 Pentagon sponsored study based on 600,000 documents 
seized in Iraq found no smoking gun, i.e. direct connection between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and 
al Qaeda.  The study also concluded that while Saddam Hussein’s regime did provide some 
support to other terrorist groups in the Middle East, the “predominant targets of the Iraqi state 
terror operations were Iraqi citizens, both inside and outside Iraq” (Woods and Lacey, 1-2).  
The Bush administration understood the domestic political importance of publicly 
asserting a collaborative al Qaeda-Iraq relationship even if such a relationship did not exist: it 
suggested a connection between Iraq and the 9/11 attacks to the U.S. electorate that was out 
for revenge.  After the 9/11 attacks, Douglas Feith established a Policy Counter Terrorism 
Evaluation Group for the purpose of finding links between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s 
regime.  The group provided an alternative intelligence that differed from that of the CIA and 
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other intelligence agencies, all of which had concluded there was no convincing evidence of an 
operational relationship between Osama bin Laden and Baghdad.  The group’s assessment, 
entitled “Iraq and al-Qaida: Making the Case,” was based on an examination of existing 
intelligence and claimed that the intelligence agencies were ignoring reports of collaboration.  
The group offered no new intelligence to support its conclusions that Iraq and al Qaeda had a 
“mature, symbiotic relationship.”  Subsequently, in March 2007, the Pentagon’s acting 
inspector general rebuked Feith’s efforts to claim such a relationship as “inappropriate” 
because he failed to clarify why his conclusion diverged from those of the rest of the 
intelligence community (Jehl, Pentagon Reportedly Skewed CIA’s View of Qaeda Time).”   
What of Iraq’s nonnuclear weapons of mass destruction?  As the invasion neared, the 
administration assumed that Iraq had some chemical munitions and biological agents that 
remained unaccounted for by the UN inspection regime following the Gulf War in 1991.  In 
August 1995, General Hussein Kamel, who was Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and former 
director of Iraq’s Military Industrial Corporation (responsible for all of Iraq’s weapons 
programs), defected to Jordan.  Kamel told debriefers that all of Iraq’s chemical and biological 
weapons had been destroyed on his orders back in 1991.  More instructive, in November 2002, 
Saddam Hussein succumbed to the pressure of a huge U.S. military buildup in Kuwait and the 
Bush administration’s increasingly strident rhetoric about the necessity of regime change in 
Baghdad.  He permitted the UN inspectors to return and gave them more or less unfettered 
access to suspected weapons sites.  Thus, U.S. diplomacy had in effect forced Saddam Hussein 
to capitulate on the very issue that formed the primary public rationale for the coming war.  If 
he had WMDs, the inspectors, who then had access to previously off-limits presidential palaces 
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and other government compounds, would eventually find them.  The inspectors had four 
months to find any WMDs and examined 141 sites before they were pulled out because of the 
impending U.S. invasion.  They reported that there was “no evidence or plausible indication of 
the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq (Kaufmann, 25).”   The White House was 
completely indifferent to the inspection team’s failure to discover any WMDs, even though the 
suspected sites that the United States and several other countries supplied to the team were 
supposedly the best that the various intelligence agencies could give.  Blix (leader of the UN 
inspection team) was prompted to wonder, “How could there be 100-percent certainty about 
the existence of weapons of mass destruction, but zero-percent knowledge about their location 
(156)?” 
The conclusion that regime change always trumped finding WMDs as a war aim is 
reinforced by the Pentagon’s invasion plan, which displayed a manifest indifference to seizing 
suspected WMD sites.  There was no directive from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to 
search for WMDs.  Only on the eve of the invasion did the U.S. Army’s chief intelligence officer 
for the invasion take it upon himself to throw together a scratch force to search the more than 
946 locations the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) had identified as possible WMD storage 
sites or production facilities (Woodward, State of Denial, 349-350).”  The DIA was unable to 
prioritize the locations and in many instances they dated from the 1991 Gulf War.  To seize and 
secure Iraq’s suspected WMDs would have required a sufficiently large and dedicated invasion 
force to capture the hundreds of suspected sites quickly and to seal Iraq’s long borders to 
prevent munitions and chemical and biological warfare substances from being spirited out of 
the country.  For example, U.S. forces failed to secure the 120-acre Tuwaitha Nuclear Research 
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Center (believed to have contained approximately two tons of partially enriched uranium) 
before unknown people ransacked it (Barton, U.S. Has Not Inspected Iraq Nuclear Facility).  If, in 
fact the main purpose of the invasion was to disarm Iraq, then the invasion plan should have 
reflected that objective.  But the plan did not! 
In COBRA II: The inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, an incisive 
assessment of the invasion plan and its implementation, Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor 
identified a surprising contradiction.  The United States did not have nearly enough troops to 
secure the hundreds of suspected WMD sites that had supposedly been identified in Iraq or to 
secure the nation’s long, porous borders.  Had the Iraqis possessed WMD and terrorist groups 
been prevalent in Iraq as the administration so loudly asserted, U.S. forces might well have 
failed to prevent WMD from being spirited out of the country and falling into the hands of the 
dark forces the administration had declared war against (503).  Those who planned Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, chief among them Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and U.S. Central Command 
commander Tommy Franks, either did not take the proliferation threat seriously or were 
dangerously derelict in their duty.  Rumsfeld and Franks dived into the minutia of planning the 
invasion, but they apparently paid little attention to the requirement of seizing control of Iraq’s 
much touted WMD.  However, during the invasion Rumsfeld declared, “We know where they 
are (This Week with George Stephanopoulos, March 30, 2003).”   
Iraq’s conventional military forces were certainly no threat by 2003, and the Bush 
administration was quite right to convey the impression that the regime’s conventional forces 
could and would be quickly destroyed.  The Iraqi air force and navy had virtually disappeared in 
the 1990s, and the Iraqi army had been reduced to a paper force.  Crippled in 1991, further 
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gutted by twelve years of military sanctions, commanded by professionally inferior regime 
loyalists, and badly positioned and trained to repel a foreign invader.  The army was incapable 
of defending Iraq, much less invading its neighbors in the Middle East.  It imploded upon 
contact with U.S. forces.  Indeed, until the very end, Saddam Hussein continued to regard an 
internal coup as the greatest danger his regime faced (Gordon 147).  Notwithstanding the 1991 
Gulf War and the more recent U.S. destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, he still 
viewed the United States as a weak willed superpower incapable of forcing him from power.  
Thus, on the eve of the U.S. invasion, Saddam Hussein was contained and deterred.  He posed 
no significant threat to the United States and no unmanageable threat to regional U.S. security 
interests.  Iraq was nuisance and an irritant but not a deadly menace.  As Colin Powell told an 
interviewer a week after the 9/11 attacks, “Iraq isn’t going anywhere.  It’s in a fairly weakened 
state.  It’s doing some things we don’t like.  We will continue to contain it (DeYoung, Soldier 
376).”    
Mobilizing U.S. public opinion for war with Iraq required presenting a worst case 
depiction of its threat while putting the costs and consequences of overthrowing Saddam 
Hussein in the best possible light.  Yes, a war was necessary, but it was going to be quick and 
cheap.  The administration correctly judged the destruction of the dictator’s regime to be a 
relatively easy military task, but it profoundly misjudged its potential political and strategic 
results.  War planning focused almost exclusively on dispatching the old regime as rapidly and 
cheaply as possible and at the expense of thinking about what would replace it and how.  In 
some cases, the administration’s war aims amounted to little more than expectations based on 
wishful thinking and reinforced by the self-serving embrace of faulty historical analogies.  For 
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example, the administration assumed that some form of democratic governance would 
naturally arise from the ashes of Baathist rule.  After all, had not democracy emerged in Japan 
during America’s postwar occupation?  The administration further assumed that America’s 
manifestly good intention in Iraq and the Iraqi people’s gratitude for being liberated from 
tyranny would foreclose the possibility of postwar armed resistance to U.S. forces.  Again, was 
this not the case when the Allies liberated France? 
“We have great information,” Cheney assured skeptical House Majority Leader Dick 
Armey in the summer of 2002.  “They’re going to welcome us. It will be like the U.S. army going 
through the streets of Paris.  They’re sitting there ready to form a new government.  The people 
will be so happy with their freedoms that we’ll probably back ourselves out of there within a 
month or two (Draper, 178).”  The White House felt the war in Iraq was going to be easier than 
what transpired in Afghanistan.  “It is important for the world to see that first of all, Iraq is a 
sophisticated society with about $16 billion in annual oil income,” President Bush declared to a 
group of U.S. conservative thinkers in the Oval Office just before the invasion.  “The degree of 
difficulty compared to Afghanistan in terms of the reconstruction effort, or from emerging from 
dictatorship, is like infinitesimal.  I mean Afghanistan has zero.”  By contrast, “Iraq is a 
sophisticated society. And it’s a society that can emerge and show the Muslim world that it’s 
possible to have peace on its borders without rallying the extremists.  And the other thing that 
will happen will be, there will be less exportation of terror out of Iraq (Draper, 189).” 
Confidence that a quick and easy victory lay ahead in Iraq begs the question of “how to 
assess the guileless optimism of the war’s architects.  Especially when professed by men who 
vaunt their lack of illusions.  Had they never heard of worst-case scenarios?  What sort of 
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foreign policy assumes that democracy has no historical, cultural, and economic preconditions?  
The apparent assumption was that democracy is society’s natural state and that it automatically 
resurfaces once “unnatural” tyranny is removed.  “There was a tendency among promoters of 
the war to believe that democracy was a default condition to which societies would revert once 
liberated from dictators (116),” recounts Francis Fukuyama.  There seemed to be no 
recognition, much less an understanding, of the often long and violent history characterizing 
the transition from autocracy to democracy.  Nor was there recognition of the possibility that 
antidemocratic organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, would exploit free speech and 
other democratic institutions to expand political power. 
Danielle Pletka, the American Enterprise institute’s vice president for foreign and 
defense policy studies, confesses that before the invasion: 
I felt secure in the knowledge that all who yearn for freedom, once 
Free, would use it well.  I was wrong.  There is no freedom gene, no 
Inner guide that understands the virtues of civil society, of secret ballots, 
of political parties. And it turns out that living under Saddam Hussein’s  
tyranny for decades conditioned Iraqis to accept unearned leadership, 
to embrace sect and tribe over ideas, and to tolerate unbridled corruption 
(There’s No Freedom Gene). 
 
The administration’s other apparent assumption was that the instrument of tyranny’s 
removal in Iraq – U.S. military power – was irresistible.  There was no expectation of an 
insurgent response, much less an appreciation of the limits of U.S. conventional military power 
for effecting fundamental political change in foreign lands.  Perhaps this arrogance was not 
surprising for a White House and neoconservative community mesmerized by America’s 
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military power and committed to a “war on terror” that from the beginning inflated the 
importance of military solutions to what at bottom are political problems.  The U.S. military 
experience in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia ought to have alerted policymakers to the risks 
inherent in a Western military invasion of a non-Western country.  It was apparently 
unimaginable to the administration’s principal war proponents that some Iraqis, especially 
those of the politically dominant minority Sunni Arab community who were about to be forcibly 
disposed of their power, might resist by all available means, including insurgent guerrilla 
warfare. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
Conclusion 
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and a receptive president combined to permit the 
translation of the neoconservatives’ ideology into established U.S. foreign policy. The Bush 
Administration based its decision to invade Iraq upon neoconservative assumptions. The first 
assumption was that Saddam Hussein’s regime was on the verge of acquiring nuclear weapons 
and had already amassed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.  The second 
assumption was that the regime had meaningful links with Al Qaeda and had something to do 
with 9/11. The third assumption was that, within Iraq, the regime’s fall would be followed by 
rapid and peaceful democratization.  The fourth assumption was that a similar democratic 
transformation would be precipitated elsewhere in the region.  This democratization would 
lead to a new eagerness among Arab governments to make peace between Israel and a 
presumptive Palestinian state.  If these four assumptions held true, the future of the Middle 
East would forever be altered by replacing dictatorships with democracy.  The Bush 
Administration maintained that the first two assumptions (WMD and links to Al Qaeda) were 
solidly supported by intelligence that we now know to be false.   
  The strategy embraced the core belief of neoconservatives in U.S. exceptionalism – the 
idea that the United States is the indispensable power in the international order and has a 
moral responsibility to promote democracy in other countries, with force if necessary.  Hence, 
neoconservatives viewed the terrorist attacks on 9/11 as an opportunity to assert Americas’ 
military primacy and remake the Middle East by establishing a democratic Iraq. 
Neoconservatives believed that Iraq offered a seemingly low-cost opportunity to demonstrate 
the credibility of U.S. power and to strengthen deterrence by putting other actual and aspiring 
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rogue states on notice that defying the United States invited military destruction.    Bush, 
Cheney, and Rumsfeld also thought that America’s reputation for being unwilling to use military 
power encouraged America’s enemies to be aggressive.  
The combination of self-serving assumptions about the danger and urgency of the Iraqi 
threat to America’s security and of the equally self-serving thinking about the costs and 
consequences of removing that threat by force condemned Operation Iraqi Freedom to 
strategic failure.  The Bush administration wanted war with Iraq because it wanted to validate 
neoconservative thought.  Hence, the administration conjured up the specter of a grave and 
gathering threat to the United States that did not in fact exist.  It is chilling to read President 
Busch’s prewar speeches now, knowing that the claims are false.  Examples are the claims from 
the famous Cincinnati speech in which President Bush asserts, “Iraq possesses and produces 
chemical and biological weapons” and is “seeking nuclear weapons.”  Even more chilling are the 
claims of operational links between Iraq and al Qaeda.  Vice President Cheney in his VFW 
speech was absolutely certain: “Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has 
weapons of mass destruction.  There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use against our 
friends, against our allies, and against us.” President Bush and Vice President Cheney may 
indeed have believed, or convinced themselves, that Saddam Hussein posed such a danger.  But 
it is also true that selling the war as one of necessity, rather than as the war of choice it actually 
was, was essential to mobilizing the necessary public and congressional support for launching it.  
Pitching Saddam Hussein as a “mad” and “unbalanced” leader who was prepared to attack the 
United States, armed with weapons of mass destruction, and allied to al Qaeda proved a 
powerful and terrifying image to an U.S. electorate still reeling from the shocks of 9/11.  Any 
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U.S. president who failed to protect the homeland from such a despot would be derelict in his 
duties as commander-in-chief. But the Iraq that the Bush administration invaded posed no 
significant, much less mortal, threat to the United States.   
 In hindsight, the war was about the arrogance of power, an interpretation perfectly 
consistent with the realist theory of international politics.  This theory holds, among other 
things, that power unbalanced is power inevitably asserted.  Free of the restraining influence of 
the Soviet Union, the United States finally moved to assert the full measure of its global military 
hegemony.  The neoconservatives’ dream come true turned into a recipe for disastrous 
strategic overreach.  History is littered with examples of great powers overreaching and the U.S. 
experience has been no exception.  In Iraq in 2003, as in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1965, its 
excessive confidence in its own military power propelled the United States into a situation in 
which that power came up short of achieving the political purpose for which it was employed.  
The supreme irony, of course, is that in Iraq a military action that was in part consciously 
designed to awe the world and to establish the image of America’s military irresistibility -
degenerated quickly into an embarrassing advertisement of the limits of U.S. conventional 
military supremacy and of the persistence of the U.S. public’s intolerance of protracted warfare 
against irregular enemies.   
 In the end, the decision to invade Iraq has turned out to be one of lingering 
consequence.  While the invasion removed Saddam Hussein and his regime from power and 
permitted the installation of a nominally democratic political system in Baghdad, truth is the 
Iraq War has alienated U.S. friends and allies around the world and exposed the limits of U.S. 
military power for all to see and exploit.  In addition, it has retarded the recapitalization of U.S. 
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air and naval power, weakened the dollar, encouraged Russian and Chinese strategic hostility, 
transformed Iraq into a recruiting and training ground for Islamist terrorism and promoted the 
expansion of Iranian power in the region.  The world now faces the real possibility of a Shiite 
regime in Baghdad aligned with Tehran that could undermine Saudi Arabia and other Sunni 
Arab states with significant Shiite minorities.  
 There are many other questions that deserve an answer that the scope of this paper and 
time limited me from addressing.  Research into the vetting of intelligence during the run up to 
the war with Iraq would contribute to a better understanding of just how the White House was 
able to make such outrageous and false claims.  If WMD was the number one concern, then 
why were no military units tasked with securing suspected WMD sites?  Why did the war plan 
have no provision for controlling the country after the defeat of the Iraqi army?  What 
happened to the realist foreign policy voices in the administration – Secretary Rice and 
Secretary Powell?  Why did no senior leaders resign in protest over this decision?  How did the   
decision to invade Iraq later impact the Obama Administrations options in Syria? These are just 
a few of the questions I think deserve further research.  As for the evidence presented in this 
paper, the logical conclusion is that the Bush Administration fixed the intelligence around the 
policy to invade Iraq,  a policy orchestrated by neoconservative ideologes.    
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